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Who’s Afraid of a Poor Old Age?: Risk Perception in Risk Management Decisions
Abstract
Retirement planning and voluntary as well as mandated contributions to pension plans require a series of
decisions under uncertainty. Those range from initial decisions about the magnitude of contributions and
allocation across different investment options and choice of option providers, to periodic reviews of these
decisions in light of possible changes in goals or circumstances. Behavioral decision research provides a
series of lessons about how such decisions are made and thus for the optimal design of pension plans.
This chapter will addresses the role of affect in perceptions of risk and subsequent decisions to take
actions that reduce or manage perceived risks. I review evidence showing that individual and group
differences in risk perception, much more than differences in risk attitude, are responsible for differences
in the choices people make. If people fail to be alarmed about a risk or hazard, they fail to take
precautions. Risk perception, on the other hand, is predictable from general characteristics of the hazard
and from prior, personal history. The risks associated with inadequate retirement planning have all the
characteristics associated with hazards that do not evoke strong visceral reactions.
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Chapter 3
Who’s Afraid of a Poor Old Age? Risk
Perception in Risk Management Decisions
Elke U. Weber

The initial decision to save anything at all, the consideration of plan
providers and investment vehicles, the periodic examination and readjustment of one’s investment portfolio, all constitute a risk management
process with important individual and societal consequences. There is little
question that the financial and social implications of low saving rates and of
inappropriate investment strategies are significant and far-reaching. And
yet the risk of being financially ill-prepared for one’s sunset years keeps few
of us awake at night, and it engenders little legislative enthusiasm among
our politicians. This chapter argues that it is the lack of any visceral perception of risk or danger that is responsible for the inadequate allocation
of personal and collective resources to deal with this issue. By inadequate
allocation of resources, I refer to both financial resources and, perhaps
even more importantly, attentional resources.
Behavioral decision research is well positioned to predict the neglect
we observe. In what follows, I review theory and empirical evidence to
document two claims:
1. Affect is the wellspring of action: When we encounter or anticipate
consequences that engender positive affect, we act in ways that will
maintain those consequences. Negative affect, on the other hand,
serves as a trigger to take action that will avoid aversive consequences
in the future. Fear, for example, motivates us to remove ourselves from
the fear-provoking situation or to change the environment in ways that
reduce the fear. Visceral reactions such as a fear or anxiety serve as an
early warning system that some risk management action is in order.
2. Perceived risk, and in particular, people’s visceral reactions to risky
situations, often has little correspondence to other measures of risk
that consider either the information-theoretical uncertainty of outcomes or the magnitude and dispersion of material consequences.
Instead, visceral judgments of risk (which fuel self-protective action)
are determined by a small number of situational characteristics that
elicit affective reactions as part of our evolutionary heritage.
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In what follows, I show that the risk of providing inadequately for one’s
retirement years and the risk of being vested in underperforming assets are
ill-suited on every dimension to elicit subjective feelings of risk. As a result, it
is not surprising that people fail to allocate the attentional resources to
retirement planning and retirement saving maintenance that they deserve,
based on their financial importance to our lives. I conclude by considering
the implications of psychological models of decisionmaking for the design
of procedures or institutions that improve on the current state of affairs.

Behavioral Decision Research and Theory
Associative/Affective versus Analytic Processing
People process information in two fundamentally different ways, mediated
by different neural substrates when they make judgments or arrive at decisions (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Slovic et al.,
2002). The first system, which is evolutionarily older, and thus shared with
lower animals, works by way of similarity and associations. It requires real
world knowledge (i.e. experienced decisionmakers make better decisions
than novices), but its basic mechanisms seem to be hard-wired. Experiencebased thinking is intuitive, automatic, and fast. It relies on images and
associations, linked by experience to emotions and affect (feelings that
something is good or bad). This system transforms uncertain and threatening aspects of the environment into affective responses (e.g. fear, dread,
anxiety) and thus represents risk as a feeling (Loewenstein et al., 2001),
which tells us whether it is safe to walk down a dark street or drink a strangesmelling liquid. The second processing system works by analytic algorithms
and rules, including those specified by normative models of judgment and
decisionmaking (e.g. the probability calculus, Bayesian updating, formal
logic, and utility maximization). It is slower and requires awareness and
conscious control.
These two processing systems typically operate in parallel and interact with
each other. Neuroscientists have demonstrated that logical argument and
analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and
affect (Damasio, 1994). We become aware of the simultaneous presence
and operation of the two systems mainly in those situations where they
produce different outputs. Thus, the question of whether a whale is a fish
produces an affirmative answer from the similarity-based processing system
(“a whale sure looks like a big fish”), but a negative response from the
analytic, rule-based system (“it can’t be a fish because it is warm blooded”).

Affect and Risk Perception
Much evidence from cognitive, social, and clinical psychology demonstrates
that risk perceptions are influenced by association and affect-driven
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processes as much or more than by analytic processes (Loewenstein et al.,
2001). In cases where the outputs from the two processing systems disagree,
the affective, association-based system usually prevails. Even in seemingly
“objective” contexts, such as financial investment decisions, subjective and
largely affective factors have been shown to influence perceptions of risk.
For example, Holtgrave and Weber (1993), showed that both affective variables (e.g. dread) and cognitive–consequentialist variables (e.g. outcomes
and probabilities) are necessary to predict people’s perception of risk in the
financial and health/safety domain.
Differences in risk perception lie at the heart of many interpersonal
and societal disputes about the best course of action. They appear to be the
result of differences in affective reactions to risky situations as the result
of prior experiences or general orienting disposition or worldview (Dake,
1991). Familiarity with a risk (e.g. acquired by daily exposure) lowers
perceptions of its riskiness, with the result that technical experts perceive
the risk of such technologies as nuclear power generation to be much
lower than members of the general public (Fischhoff et al., 1978). Hertwig
et al. (Forthcoming) describe the affective processing and updating mechanisms by which personal experience with rare events (e.g. negative consequences that have a low probability of occurrence) leads to a greater risk
taking (and lower risk perception) than the statistic description of the
same events. Numerous studies show differences in risk perception
between men and women, with women judging health, safety, and recreational risks (Slovic, 1987; Flynn et al., 1994; Finucane et al., 2000) and also
financial and ethical risks (Weber et al., 2002) to be larger and more problematic than men. This gender difference in perceived riskiness reverses
only in the social domain, in which women have greater familiarity with
risks and risk taking (Weber et al., 2002). This tendency of women to worry
more about financial risks is consistent with the result observed by SethiIyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (this volume) to enroll in voluntary pension
plans in greater numbers and make larger contributions. Weber and Hsee
(1998, 1999) find differences in the perception of financial risks between
American and Chinese investors—with Chinese investors perceiving the risks
of investment options to be lower and showing greater willingness to invest
in risky options—and then explain these differences in risk ratings and
expressions of worry by cultural differences in social collectivism. Chinese
investors tend to have larger social networks (family members and associates) to which they can turn for material support than American investors;
these networks provide implicit insurance against catastrophic risks, and
thus lower both the objective and experienced level of risk.
These studies and many others show that differences in risk perception
but not (so much) differences in risk attitude are responsible for group or
individual differences in risk-taking behavior, that is, differences in preference for risky decision alternatives (Weber and Milliman, 1997). Risk taking
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and risk attitude have been conceptualized in several ways (Weber, 1999,
2001a). The most promising and consistent approach seems to be provided
by models that allow for the fact that individuals or groups may differ in
their subjective perception of risk and in their risk attitude, (i.e. reaction to
risk), which some people find exciting and pleasurable (and thus seek out)
and most people evaluate negatively (and thus avoid). While there are individual differences in risk attitude (i.e. positive or negative reaction towards
risk, as it is perceived), probably mediated by biological differences in
optimal arousal levels, differences in risk perception (mediated by culturally determined differences in worry and concern about possible adverse
consequences) are a far better predictor of risk taking.

Measuring Risk Perception
At least three different paradigms have studied subjective risk perception,
with the goal of explaining individual and group differences in perceived
risk (Weber, 2001b). Studies within the first measurement paradigm, known
as axiomatic studies, have focused on the way in which people subjectively
transform objective risk information (i.e. possible consequences of risky
choice options such as mortality rates or financial returns and their likelihood of occurrence) in ways that reflect the impact that these events have
on their lives (cf. Weber, 2001b; Palmer, 1996). The conjoint-expected risk
model, for example, allows for the possibility that upside variability in financial returns has a different and usually smaller effect on perceived riskiness
than downside variability (Luce and Weber, 1986). Studies within the second
paradigm, called the sociocultural group, have examined the effect of group
and culture-level variables on risk perception (e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky,
1982). Research within the third or psychometric paradigm is of greatest
interest to our discussion, since it explicitly addresses people’s emotional reactions to risky situations. It shows that these psychological/affective risk dimensions strongly influence judgments of the riskiness of physical, environmental,
and material risks in ways that go beyond their objective consequences
(Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1984).

Dread and Predictability as Determinants of Perceived Risk
The psychometric paradigm uses psychophysical scaling and multivariate
analysis techniques to identify the characteristics of hazards that affect
people’s quantitative judgments about their perceived riskiness. Figure 3-1
shows a two-dimensional factor space that has been replicated across numerous studies covering both lay people and technical experts judging large
and diverse sets of hazards in multiple countries (Slovic, 1987). Factor 1,
labeled “dread risk,” captures aspects of the described hazards that speed
up our heart rate and make us anxious as we contemplate them: Perceived
lack of control over exposure to the risk, with consequences that are
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Factor 2
Unknown risk

Laetrile
Microwave ovens
Water fluoridation
Saccharin
Water chlorination
Coal tar hairdyes
Oral contraceptives
Valium

DNA technology

Nitrates
Hexachlorophene
Polyvinyl
Chloride
diagnostic
X-rays
IUD
Darvon Antibiotics
Rubber
mfg.
Auto lead
Lead paint

Caffeine
Aspirin

Electric fields
DES
Nitrogen fertilizers

SST

Radioactive waste
Cadmium usage
2,4,5-T
Trichloroethylene
Nuclear reactor
Pesticides
accidents
Uranium mining
Asbestos
Nuclear weapons
PCBs
Insulation
fallout
Satellite crashes
DDT
Mercury Fossil fuels
Coal burning (Pollution)

Mirex

Factor 1
Dread risk

Vaccines
Skateboards

Auto exhaust (CO)
LNG storage &
transport
D-CON
Coal mining (Disease)

Smoking (disease)
Power mowers
Snowmobiles
Tractors

Nerve gas accidents

Large dams
Sky scraper fires

Trampolines

Alcohol
Chainsaws

Nuclear weapons (war)
Underwater
construction
Coal mining accidents
Sport parachutes
General aviation
High construction
Railroad collisions
Alcohol
Commercial aviation
accidents
Auto racing

Elevators
Electric wir & appl (Fires)
Smoking

Home swimming pools
Downhill skiing
Recreational boating
Electric wir & appl (Shock)
Bicycles

Motorcycles
Bridges
Fireworks

Auto accidents
Handguns
Dynamite

Factor 2

Contollable
Not dread
Not global catastrophic
Consequences not fatal
Equitable
Individual
Low risk to future generations
Easily reduced
Risk decreasing
Voluntary

Not observable
Unknown to those exposed
Effect delayed
New risk
Risk unknown to science

Observable
Known to those exposed
Effect immediate
Old risk
Risk known to science

Uncontrollable
Dread
Global catastrophic
Consequences fatal
Not equitable
Catastrophic
High risk to future generations
Not easily reduced
Risk increasing
Involuntary

Factor 1

Figure 3-1. Location of 81 hazards in a two-dimensional space derived by factor
analysis from the intercorrelations of 15 risk characteristics.
Note : Each factor is made up of a combination of characteristics, as indicated by the lower
diagram.
Source : Slovic (1987).

catastrophic, and may have global ramifications or affect future generations. At its high (right-hand) end, we find such hazards as nuclear weapons
fallout, nuclear reactor accidents, or nerve gas accidents or attacks. Factor 2,
labeled “unknown risk,” refers to the degree to which exposure to a hazard
and its consequences are predictable and observable: how much is known
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about the hazard and is exposure easily detected? At the high (top) end,
we find chemical hazards and radiation, which might kill exposed parties
without their awareness, and DNA technology which has unforeseeable
consequences not yet tested by time.

Perceived Risk of Inadequate Pension Saving
It is an interesting and instructive exercise to place the hazard of not having
adequate financial means in one’s old age into the two-dimensional space of
Figure 3-1. Most people would probably characterize it as a risk that is controllable, non-fatal, observable, and predictable, which would place it into
the “harmless–harmless” lower-left quadrant, comparable to such hazards as
riding a bicycle or owning and operating a home swimming pool.
Yet, in addition to its psychological risk-dimension profile, other factors
also contribute to the fact that the prospect of financial destitution in old
age carries low emotional intensity and perceived threat. Trope and
Liberman (2003) argue convincingly that people construe future events
differently, depending on their temporal distance to them. In particular,
events in the distant future (an invitation to give a conference paper 2 years
from now, or retirement 20 or 30 years from now) tends to be construed in
terms of abstract features, whereas events close to us in time (the upcoming
trip on Monday to attend the long-scheduled conference, or the possibility
to escape winter chills for a week with an advertised last-minute travel
special to Bermuda) are construed in very concrete terms. A number of
interesting behavioral phenomena derive from this construal difference.
One difference between the abstract versus concrete representation of the
consequences of possible actions important for our discussion lies in their
discrepancy in affective strength, or visceral salience and impact. Abstract
representations of consequences in the distant future (e.g. “living on
60 percent of your current income”) lack concrete associations connected
to emotional reactions, essentially by definition. In contrast, concrete
representations of choice alternatives in the present or in the near future
(e.g. “buying the 5-bedroom, 4 bath, ocean-front bungalow you saw last
week, that will provide space and recreation for your growing family”) tend
to be saturated with affective associations.
The difference in the richness and concreteness of the representation of
anticipated consequences of close versus distant consequences (and thus in
their affective strength) may well lie at the root of observed problems of
self-control, arising from impatience and impulsivity in obtaining desirable
outcomes (Mischel, Grusec, and Masters, 1969; Laibson, 1997) or procrastination with undesirable tasks (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Duflo
and Saez (Chapter 8, this volume) drew the analogy between obstacles to
adequate pension saving and obstacles to successful dieting, and they
address the self-control issues therein. Both pension saving and dieting
require the sacrifice of concrete, immediate, benefits, for the sake of
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abstract, distant goals. While these phenomena can and have been modeled by hyperbolic time discounting functions (Ainslie, 1975; Loewenstein
and Elster, 1992), at a behavioral process level it most likely is the strong
positive affect associated with immediate consequences that drives impulsive consumption decisions. The affective impoverishment of both the
positive and the negative distant future consequences of current actions
related to retirement saving puts any decision options that would increase
positive consequences and decrease negative consequences in the distant
future at a distinct disadvantage.

Affect, Risk Perception, and Action
Visceral factors, including emotions and affect, have a potent impact on
behavior (Loewenstein, 1996). In general terms, visceral states such as
hunger or fear have the effect of focusing attention and motivation on
activities and forms of consumption associated with the visceral factor. In
the context of risk management, the specific hypothesis we propose is the
following: A visceral perception of some risk is a necessary condition for
any action taken to manage the risk. Putting it negatively, a purely analytic
judgment of risk will have little or no impact on behavior. In situations
where choice options with affective reactions to possible consequences
compete with choice options that have no affective associations, people’s
attentional focus hypothesis will predict decisions that favor consideration
of the former and neglect of the latter.
Is there any evidence for the view that the affect generated by a potentially dangerous situation drives action to reduce the affect-flagged risk, and
that the absence (or removal) of the affective risk perception component
reduces the likelihood of risk management actions? Evidence comes from a
variety of sources. Damasio (1994) argues that decisionmakers encode the
consequences of alternative courses of action affectively, and that such
“somatic markers” are an essential input into future decisions. The prefrontal cortex of the brain seems to play a critical role in translating cognitive inputs from the cortex into terms that the emotional mind can
understand. A study was conducted in which patients suffering damage to
the prefrontal cortex and normal subjects played a game in which the objective was to win as much money as possible (Bechara et al., 1997). Players
earned hypothetical money by turning over cards on which were written
either monetary gains or losses. On any given turn, subjects could draw
from any of four decks, two of which included high payments ($100) and
two of which contained lower payments ($50). The high-paying deck, however, also included occasional very large losses, to the point where these
decks had a net negative expected value. The investigators found that both
normal subjects and prefrontal subjects began by sampling from all four
decks, and both groups avoided high-paying decks immediately after
penalty cards were encountered. But compared to normal respondents,
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prefrontal patients returned to the high-paying decks more quickly after suffering a loss. As a result of this tendency, the prefrontal subjects often went
“bankrupt” in spite of a (reportedly) strong desire to win and a thorough
understanding of the game. One possible interpretation of the prefrontal
patients’ behavior is that even though they “knew” the high-paying deck was
risky, their inability to experience fear when contemplating a draw from one
of those decks made risky draws more palatable. Consistent with this interpretation, subsequent research has examined the behavior of normal subjects in this task, and it found that those people who showed higher affective
reactions to negative events (as measured by two standard scales) were more
likely to sample from the lower-paying, but safer decks of cards (Peters and
Slovic, 2000).
Additional support for the idea that affect plays an important role in
behavioral intentions and actual behavior comes from a series of studies by
Slovic and collaborators. In a typical study, participants free-associate about
a concept of interest to the experimenters. For health-related behaviors
such as smoking or exercising (Benthin et al., 1995), respondents might
be asked to list everything that comes to mind when they hear the word
“cigarette” or “jogging.” In the financial domain, they might be asked to list
everything that comes to mind when they hear the name of a new company
on the stock market (Slovic et al., 2000). Trained raters subsequently evaluate
the positive and negative affective connotations of the responses elicited in
these free associations. Both for health-related behaviors and for investment
decisions, these ratings of the (positive or negative) affective tone of respondents’ free associations show strong correlations with their propensity to act.
Thus, people with more positive imagery about exercising tend to exercise
more, those with more negative imagery toward smoking tend to smoke
less, and those who have more positive associations with a given company
are more likely to buy its stock.

Single Action Bias
There is another class of suboptimal risk management response that is at
least consistent with the role of affect as a flag for action. Weber (1997)
coined the phrase single action bias for the following phenomenon observed
in a wide range of contexts (e.g. medical diagnosis, farmers’ reactions to
climate change). Decisionmakers are very likely to take one action to reduce
a risk that they encounter, but they are much less likely to take additional
steps that would provide incremental protection or risk reduction. The single action taken is not necessarily the most effective one, nor is it the same
for different decisionmakers. However, regardless of which single action is
taken first, decisionmakers have a tendency to stop from taking further
action, presumably because the first action suffices in reducing the feeling of
fear or threat. Thus, Berbaum et al. (1991) found that radiologists looking
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for abnormalities in X-rays often halt their search after finding one lesion,
leaving additional lesions undetected. Weber (1997) found that farmers who
became concerned about climate change in the early 1990s were likely to
change either something in their production practice (e.g. irrigate), their
pricing practice (e.g. ensure crop prices through the futures market), or
lobby for government interventions (e.g. ethanol taxes). But they hardly
ever engaged in more than one of those actions, even though a portfolio of
protective actions might have been advisable. The fear of climate change
seemed to set a “flag” that some action was required, but it remained in place
only until one such action was taken. Thus, any single protective action had
the effect of taking down the “impending danger flag.”
While such behavior might have served humans well in evolutionary
history, where single actions generally sufficed to contain important risks,
purely affect-driven, single-action biased responses may not be sufficient in
more complex environments where a portfolio of risk management actions
is advised. The single-action bias illustrates the connection between visceral
reaction to some risk and risk management actions. In the absence of a fear
or dread response to the prospect of economic destitution in old age, purely
affect-driven risk management decisions will likely result in insufficient
responsiveness to the risk.

Implications for Pension Decisionmaking
Our review of the behavioral decision literature tells us a great deal about
how retirement saving decisions ought to be guided and structured. We
structure our consideration of implications around the different component
decisions that people encounter as part of the retirement risk management
process. There are at least three classes of decisions: (i) The initial decision
to save towards retirement at all, above and beyond any legally mandated
contributions, and how much to put away; (ii) choice between plan providers
and investment vehicles; and (iii) the decision to periodically examine and
rebalance one’s investment portfolio. Since others (Sethi-Iyengar, Huberman,
and Jiang, Chapter 5, this volume; Statman, Chapter 4, this volume) have
plenty to say about behavioral decision research results that speak to
decisions in Class 2, I restrict myself to implications regarding decisions in
Classes 1 and 3. In the course of considering lessons and implications, I also
think of other decision situations offering useful parallels for retirement
investment decisions.

Whether to Save for One’s Retirement and How Much
These decisions clearly suffer from the lack of attention to distant consequences of one’s actions (i.e. the disproportionate temporal discounting)
that people experience when considering tradeoffs between choices
that result either in sacrifices in consumption now, or in sacrifices in
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consumption in the distant future. I have argued that the reason for this
attentional neglect lies in the abstract representation of distant-future consequences and in the psychological risk dimension profile of the hazard.
Contemplating the consequences of inadequate pension saving does not
result in an affective reaction of fear or worry. As a result, no “flag” gets set
that indicates the presence of some “clear and present danger” which mandates some protective action. In addition to retirement saving decisions,
individual or societal decisions to manage such risks as climate change and
species depletion fall into the same category of threats that fail to elicit fear
or anxiety. In the absence of such anxiety, the impetus to take action is
greatly reduced. A clear implication of this analysis is the prescription to
engage decisionmakers in exercises that will concretize the consequences of
their current choices. If it is the abstract and often statistical nature of information about consequences in the distant future that is responsible for the
lack of visceral reaction to potentially serious circumstances, we ought to
find ways to turn those statistics into experiential consequences that do
carry affective associations, perhaps in the form of simulation games that
dramatize and illustrate life at 60 percent of one’s current budget levels.
Another factor distinguishing the retirement problem from the relationship between fear and action described above, is the fact that any contemplation of one’s eventual demise and death is existentially disquieting and
unpleasant. In this respect, retirement-related decisionmaking is analogous
to decisionmaking about organ donation or estate planning. Such decisions
involve topics that decisionmakers find inherently unpleasant, and thus any
consideration of these questions tends to be avoided, not because of lack of
attention or because of lack of an affective signal, but because the topic generates negative affect in the present. Setting the right kind of defaults for
decisions where such avoidance behavior might be expected may be the
best way to help people make decisions more in line with their own preferences and long-term self-interest, and certainly more in line with societal
interests. European countries, for example, differ in the default preference
assumed when citizens fail to make a decision on whether or not to donate
some or any of their organs after death. In those countries that assume, as a
default, that people want to donate their organs (i.e. action is required to
opt out), compared to those countries that assume that people do not want
to donate their organs (i.e. action is required to opt in), the rates of
declared and actual organ donations are dramatically larger, and they are
typically closer to those proportion of people who express a positive attitude
towards organ donations in opinion surveys ( Johnson and Goldstein,
2003). In those cases where the deliberation necessary to make a deliberate
decision has aversive elements (e.g. the contemplation of one’s own death),
it may well be a mark of enlightened paternalism to set non-action or nondecision defaults in ways that maximize the well-being of the reluctant decisionmakers over time (Statman, this volume). The experiments reported by
Benartzi and Thaler (2004) show that the lessons from organ donation
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transfer to the design of voluntary pension investment plans. Making contributions the default outcome that happens when employees fail to make a
deliberate decision seems to align participation and saving rates more
closely to participants’ long-term interests.

Whether and When to Examine and Rebalance
One’s Retirement Investment Portfolio
In addition to low savings rates, retirement savings account maintenance
presents another problem. Several studies show that the median number
of changes that people make to their pension investment portfolio over
their lifetime may be zero (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Ameriks and
Zeldes, 2000; Benartzi and Thaler, 2004). Part of the reluctance to spend
time or energy on retirement saving maintenance decisions is undoubtedly
related to the two mechanisms discussed in the last section. First, failure to
take any maintenance action does not have consequences that frighten the
decisionmaker in any way, and the taking of some action does not result
in immediate delight. Second, every revisit of a retirement saving decision
is an unwelcome reminder of pending decline and eventual death.
Recent behavioral decision research on decision modes, that examine the
qualitatively different ways in which people make decisions, may provide
some additional insights for the design of procedures or institutions to promote more optimal retirement saving behavior (Weber, 1998). This research
suggests that people use a much broader range of decision modes than traditionally studied in psychology, economics, and management science. For
example, Yates and Lee (1996) coined the term decision modes in their
description of particular methods or strategies for arriving at decisions and
distinguished between analytic, rule-based, and automatic decision modes.
Weber (1998) proposes a similar, though somewhat more differentiated taxonomy of modes. While the analytic decision mode of arriving at a decision
by explicit or implicit weighing the costs and benefits of different alternatives
has received most of decision-theoretical and empirical attention, a recent
content analysis of the twentieth-century American and Chinese novels,
thought to be representative of contemporary decisions and decision
processes, shows that only about one-third of even the major decisions in
these novels were described as having been made in an analytic mode
(Weber et al., 2004). Two other decision modes were just as common, or
even more common: Affect-based decisions, in which people base their decision on their immediate, holistic, affective reaction to different choice alternatives, with affect-guided approach and avoidance reactions as the primary
decision process (Epstein, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001); and recognitionand-rule-based decisions, where people recognize the decision situation as a
member of a category for which a best action is known (Simon, 1990). As
soon as the decision situation has been classified, an “if–then” rule is activated, which implements the known best action. Examples include the rule
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of a recovering alcoholic never to accept any alcoholic beverage, or a dieter’s
rule never to eat after 5 PM. Many other explicitly and consciously rule-based
decision situations involve self-control issues (Prelec and Herrnstein, 1991).
In sum, the evidence reviewed here suggests that cost–benefit decisions
about whether to engage in some retirement portfolio review may not
result in a decision that is in a person’s long-term financial best interest.
This is because the costs of taking action are immediate and concrete, and
the benefits distant and abstract. Similarly, an affect-driven decision will not
result in a retirement portfolio review. Failure to take action does not
frighten people and anticipation of taking this action does not delight.
Nevertheless, procedures that encourage the establishment of rules (“once
a year, when I get my annual account report, I review my investment portfolio”), analogous to the rules we set and follow about visiting dentists and
doctors for checkups at regular intervals, and the use of a rule-based decision mode for this purpose, hold much stronger promise. Social influence
techniques of the type discussed by Duflo and Saez (this volume) can be
used to establish the required behavioral norms.
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